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COMMENTS
LAWS LIKE WHITE ELEPHANTS*:




When twenty-seven year old Darlene Johnson beat her two children with
a belt and an electrical cord it never occurred to her that she would be ar-
rested and charged with three counts of felony child abuse. Nor did she
expect to be caught up in the middle of a maelstrom of national controversy.
When Judge Howard Broadman, a California Superior Court Judge notori-
ous for creative sentencing, gave Darlene a sentencing choice, however, the
storm clouds gathered. According to Broadman's sentence, Darlene could
either spend four years in prison or serve her time on probation on the con-
dition that she be implanted with the new Norplant contraceptive device for
three years.' Frightened by the thought of going to prison and losing her
children, Darlene accepted the probation and implant offer. 2 Later, uneasy
with undergoing the minor surgery required to implant the contraceptive
and hearing of the device's potential side effects, Darlene withdrew her con-
sent to the agreement. 3
* An interesting similarity exists between the debate aroused by Judge Howard
Broadman's order and the exchange of a young couple in Ernest Hemingway's short story,
"Hills Like White Elephants." ERNEST HEMINGWAY, Hills Like White Elephants, in THE
FIFrH COLUMN AND THE FIRST FORTY-NINE STORIES 371(1938); see also J. MEYERS,
HEMINGWAY: A BIOGRAPHY 196-97 (1985). Hemingway's vignette describes a conversation
between a man and his girlfriend while awaiting a train to Madrid. The man subtly encourages
his unsophisticated girlfriend to consent to an abortion by describing the procedure as a
natural and rational option that will guarantee a return to their prior carefree lifestyle. The
woman finds the abortion procedure frighteningly unnatural, but is resigned to the fact that
the operation is the only way she can maintain her relationship with this man. It is only
through continuous pleading that the woman is able to convince the man to discuss something
else.
Similarly, advocates for sterilization encourage women like Darlene Johnson to undergo
Norplant implants or risk losing their children. Further, proponents of such use buttress their
policy with appeals to rationality.
1. State v. Johnson, No. 29390, slip op., at 13-14 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 10, 1991) (motion
to modify sentence); see Susan Cruzan, Food and Drug Administration, Press Release (Dec.
10, 1990); WYETH LABORATORIES, INC., NORPLANT SYSTEM-PATIENT LABELING (1990)
[hereinafter "Norplant System"].
2. Johnson, No. 29390, slip op. at 3, 13-14.
3. Id.; Michael Ryan, Did the Judge go too Far?, PARADE MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 1991, at
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At first glance, Broadman's sentence appears to be a common sense ap-
proach to the problem of child abuse. If a woman is unable to care properly
for the children she has, eliminate her right to have additional children. In
addition to using Norplant to alleviate the problems of child abuse, at least
one legislator has proposed using Norplant to solve the problem of drug
abuse among pregnant women. Kansas representative Kerry Patrick, who
declared that society should "stop worrying about the rights of the mother,"
recently proposed a bill requiring Norplant implants for all mothers who
give birth to drug-addicted babies until they successfully pass twelve
monthly drug tests.4 California Governor Pete Wilson and some editorial
writers suggest using the implants to cut down on poverty. 5 Proponents ar-
gue that the state should give monetary incentives to mothers on welfare
who use the Norplant contraceptive and withdraw funds from those mothers
who do not voluntarily use the implant. 6 California Governor Wilson intro-
duced a plan to make the Norplant contraceptive financially available to
poor women and teenagers by utilizing state subsidies.7 A controversial edi-
torial in the Philadelphia Inquirer went so far as to advocate Norplant use to
reduce the population of the "underclass," which includes the poor and mi-
norities who create a burden on the rest of society. 8
Judge Broadman's decision brought to light the constitutional question of
whether the judicial or legislative branch may issue sentences or pass laws
that use Norplant as a preventative medicine to reduce child abuse, welfare,
and drug addicted infants. The utilitarian argument in favor of sterilization
perceives women as unable to control their sexual behavior, drug abuse
problems, or tendencies toward child abuse, thereby draining the state and
federal budgets. 9 Utilitarians view Norplant as a miraculous panacea.10
George Annas, director of the program on law, medicine, and ethics at
Boston University School of Medicine, notes that Norplant presents a spe-
8-9; John Hurst, Controversial Judge Dodges not only Critics, but Bullet, Los ANGELES TIMES,
April 29, 1991, at A3; Tamar Lewin, Implanted Birth Control Device Renews Debate over
Forced Contraception, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A20.
4. See Drug Addicted Moms-Norplant Would Enable us to Keep Denying the Real
Problems, SEATrLE TIMES, July 16, 1991, at A7; James Willwerth, Should We Take Away
Their Kids? Often the Best Way to Save the Child is to Save the Mother as Well, TIME, May 13,
1991, at 62; George Skelton & Daniel M. Weintraub, The Times Poll: Most Support Norplant
for Teens, Drug Addicts, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 27, 1991, at Al. In a statewide random-
digit survey of 1,679 California adults with a 3% margin of error, results showed that 61% of
those polled favored mandatory Norplant for drug abusers. The majority in all the categories
of respondents responded favorably to the use of Norplant. Half of all African-Americans and
more than half of the Latinos surveyed strongly approved of the concept. Skelton and Wein-
traub, supra at Al.
5. Daniel B. Wood, Wilson Stays Course in California Budget Battle, CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR, July 16, 1991, at U.S.1.
6. Id.
7. Id. Wilson states that he has yet to decide if he will support state legislation compel-
ling women who have "crack babies" to undergo Norplant implantation. See Tim Rutten,
Norplanting or Supplanting Private Rights, Los ANGELES TIMEs, May 31, 1991, at El.
8. Poverty and Norplant-Can Contraception Reduce the Underclass?, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Dec. 12, 1990, at AIS.




cial temptation to legislators and judges anxious to find solutions to today's
social problems because it is relatively inexpensive, easily monitored, and
effective.II He predicts that more attempts to use Norplant as a cure-all will
force society to contend with the problems its use presents.' 2
Where does society draw the line? Any discussion of involuntary steriliza-
tion arouses controversial constitutional questions that society must answer
before the government or courts can proceed with plans to curtail reproduc-
tion as a solution to society's problems. Unless society answers these ques-
tions, women face the threat of a government that, cloaked in the self-
righteousness of common-sense, is ready to steal their fundamental right to
control their reproductive systems.
This Comment attempts to answer some of the questions raised by forced
Norplant implantation. This Comment begins with a brief discussion of the
origins of the general right to privacy. It then traces the development of the
right to privacy as it pertains to reproductive issues: first, in establishing and
defining a woman's reproductive rights derived from the general right to
privacy; second, in analyzing current attempts to define those rights more
closely; and, third, in balancing women's reproductive rights against other
legitimate state interests. Finally, this comment focuses on constitutional
objections to using Norplant to keep women from reproducing and the possi-
ble outcome of Supreme Court decisions on the issue.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. The Supreme Court Framework for Analysis of State Statutes and
Constitutuional Rights
Any analysis of Supreme Court treatment of various constitutional rights
and privileges must begin with a review of the different levels of scrutiny the
Court uses when examining state statutes that restrict or curtail the alleged
rights. The Court is often faced with the task of balancing the states' inter-
ests in exercising their police powers to further the public health, safety, and
welfare against the individual's right to be free from burdensome state regu-
lations.13 Traditionally, the Court upholds state police power regulation if
the law in question is reasonable and rationally related to the attainment of a
legitimate governmental goal.' 4 Where the state legislation comes into con-
flict with a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, however, the
Court requires that the law pass a more stringent test.15 When a fundamen-
11. Tamar Lewin, Implanted Birth Control Device Renews Debate Over Forced Contracep-
tion, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A20.
12. Id.
13. Stephen L. Isaacs, The Law of Fertility Regulation in the United States: A 1980 Re-
view, 19 J. FAM. L. 65, 66 (1980).
14. Id.
15. Id. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]he nature of the right invaded is pertinent
... for statutes regulating sensitive areas of liberty do, under the cases of this Court, require
'strict scrutiny.'" Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 774 n.3 (1986) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)) and "must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose". Sheldon v.
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tal right is threatened, a state must demonstrate that the law in question is
necessary and narrowly drawn to promote a compelling state interest. 16 If
the state cannot meet this standard, the Court will declare the statute
unconstitutional. 17
B. The Constitutional Right To Privacy
Although the Constitution contains no explicit mention of a right to pri-
vacy, legal scholars and courts alike accept the theory that such a right ex-
ists. Generally, the right to privacy "is the right to be free from the
unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality," and to be
free in one's private affairs.' 8 In 1890, Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D.
Warren first introduced the concept of a distinct right to privacy in a law
review article advancing the need for a tort cause of action for people ex-
ploited for commercial purposes, such as when, for example, advertisers use
celebrity names or likenesses to sell products without the celebrities' prior
consent. 19 They argued that people have a basic right, not found at common
law, to be free from both public disclosure of private facts and appropriation
of their names or likenesses for another's benefit. 20 Later, Justice Brandeis
defined this right as the "most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men."' 2 1 Since the Brandeis and Warren article, the right
to privacy has been "the right of an individual to be left alone, to live a life of
seclusion, and to be free from unwanted publicity."'22 In one jurist's words,
the right to privacy is the "right to define one's circle of intimacy."' 23 One
justification for creating this right that is not explicitly stated in the Consti-
tution is that privacy is necessary to prevent a complex society and govern-
mental structure from encroaching on a citizen's personal freedom when
technological advancements make that intrusion increasingly simple.24
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Where a fundamental right is threatened, the State may
prevail only upon a showing of a compelling interest. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960). Although the Court has yet to come up with a definition of "fundamental right,"
frequently cited definitions include those rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), and that "cannot be denied without
violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions ......."Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (quot-
ing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
16. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
17. Id.
18. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 1 (1990).
19. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195-96 (1890). But cf, William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (distinguish-
ing appropriation from intrusion and invasion of privacy).
20. Brandeis & Warren, supra note 19, at 195-96.
21. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22. Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enter. Inc., 589 S.W.2d 489, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
23. Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting Briscoe v.
Readers Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971)).
24. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy, § 4 (1990).
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C The Right to Privacy in the Home
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the right to privacy in
one's home in 1886. The Court in Boyd v. United States25 held that the
Constitution provides protection against all unjustified governmental inva-
sions into the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."'26 Boyd
concerned attempts by a United States district attorney to force criminal
defendants to produce personal documents that would allegedly prove crimi-
nal charges made against those defendants. 27 The Court in Boyd held that
"compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal
charge against him, or to forfeit his property" violates the Fourth Amend-
ment right to privacy. 28 The Court considers this right to privacy as impor-
tant as any of the other carefully articulated rights provided by the
Constitution.29 It is enforceable in the same manner as other basic constitu-
tional rights.30
III. PROGRESSION TOWARD THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY
A. The Eugenics Movement of the Early 1900s
While the Court developed the right to privacy in Boyd 31 as a protection
against unjustified invasion of the home, citizens remained relatively unpro-
tected against similar governmental invasions of their bodies. For example,
the eugenics movement of the early 1900's sought to use sterilization to pre-
vent mental defectives, the criminally inclined, and the mentally retarded
from reproducing.32 During the heyday of the eugenics movement in 1927,
the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell 33 upheld compulsory sterilization of
mental defectives, the retarded, or the insane. 34 Justice Holmes wrote the
25. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
26. Id. at 630. The Court stated that the privacy principles established in Boyd apply to
all such invasions by the government and its employees. The Court further held that it was not
the actual breaking into Boyd's home that constituted "the essence of the offense; but it [was]
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security ...." Id.
27. Id. at 618.
28. Id. at 622.
29. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
30. Id. at 660.
31. 116 U.S. at 630.
32. Eugenics is the study of the agencies under social control that may improve or impair
the qualities of future generations. Richard A. Estacio, Comment, Sterilization of the Mentally
Disabled in Pennsylvania: Three Generations without Legislative Guidance are Enough, 92
DICK. L. REV. 409, 411 (1988). Negative eugenics seeks to eliminate procreation of the unfit.
Id.; see also, ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 357-58 (2d ed. 1949) (de-
fining eugenics as "the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair...
future generations either physically or mentally"); Sandra S. Coleman, Comment, Involuntary
Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded: Blessing or Burden?, 25 S.D. L. REV. 55, 57 (discussing
the origins of the eugenics movement); Susan Stefan, Whose Egg is it Anyway?: Reproductive
Rights of Incarcerated, Institutionalized, and Incompetent Women, 13 NOVA L. REV. 405,413-
27 (1989) (relating the history of sterilization in the Twentieth Century). Margaret Sanger
summarized the foundation of the eugenics movement when she wrote, "[m]ore children from
the fit, less from the unfit-that is the chief issue of birth control." Tim Ruttan, Norplanting or
Supplanting Private Rights, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 31, 1991, at El.
33. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
34. Id. at 207.
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opinion for the Court, upholding a state statute compelling the involuntary
sterilization of a sixteen-year-old mentally retarded woman. 35 In a startling
example of the times, Justice Holmes stated,
[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
cutting the Fallopian tubes . . . . Three generations of imbeciles are
enough. 36
B. The Right to Privacy Extended to Provide Freedom from
Nonconsensual Bodily Invasions
After the Court recognized the concept of protection from unwarranted
invasion in the home, the court extended this right to encompass protection
from nonconsensual bodily invasions as well, thereby contributing to the de-
cline of the eugenics movement. In several of their decisions, the courts in-
terpreted the right to be "secure in your person" to prohibit nonconsensual
surgical invasions. 37 The nonconsensual invasions in these cases were both
minor and instrumental in obtaining crucial evidence against criminal de-
fendants. 38 In 1990 the Supreme Court, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health,39 reaffirmed the idea that competent persons have the
35. Id. at 205-07.
36. Id. at 207.
37. Smith v. Superior Ct., 725 P.2d 1101, 1103-04 (Ariz. 1986) (appellate court refused to
uphold sentence of sterilization unauthorized by statute); Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849,
857 (9th Cir. 1977) (upheld the use of castration as punishment only if the convict's consent to
sterilization as an alternative to imprisonment was truly voluntary); South Carolina v. Wil-
liams, Indictment No. 86-187, July 7, 1986; Jef Freely, Woman Accepts Sterilization as Term of
Plea, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 61; see also In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. 1990)
(involuntary surgical intrusions must be carefully scrutinized because of their traumatic, po-
tentially long-lasting emotional effects).
38. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (Justice Brennan stated that surgical
intrusion into an accused robber's chest to remove a bullet was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because it would violate the defendant's right to be secure in his person, despite
the fact that the surgery was likely to produce crucial evidence); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172-73 (1952). The Court held that forcible pumping of a criminal suspect's stomach
without his consent violated the individual's Fourth Amendment due process rights. This type
of nonconsensual bodily intrusion was condemned by the court as "conduct that shocks the
conscience." Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. The Rochin Court added that in order to be
brutal and.., offensive to human dignity.... a bodily intrusion need not leave
the civilized jurist reeling; it should suffice (1) that the imposition was deficient
in procedural regularity, or (2) that it was needlessly severe, or (3) that it was
too novel, or (4) that it was lacking in a fair measure of reciprocity.
Id. at 174; see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-9, 1332 (2d ed.
1988). Factors considered in determining whether an intrusion was too severe include the
presence of physical pain, creation of anxiety and apprehension of danger, permanence, com-
plications, risk of irreversible injury to health, and danger to life itself. TRIBE, supra at 1332-
33. But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760 (1966) (Court held warrant necessary
before an involuntary blood test of a suspected drunk driver could be taken); United States v.
Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding the same as in Hughes), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Hughes v. United States, 429 A.2d 1339, 1341 (D.C. 1981) (Fourth
Amendment not violated by state's non-consensual surgical removal of bullet from suspect's
body).
39. 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1990). This case involved an action for a declaratory judgment
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right to withhold their consent to surgical procedures even if those proce-
dures are in their best interests. In reaching its decision, the Court applied a
balancing test, weighing the right of the individual to be free from noncon-
sensual medical procedures against society's interests in preserving human
life by the use of medical intervention and life support systems.4 The Court
in Cruzan expressed its continued support for the right of persons to be se-
cure in themselves and their right to control their bodies.4 '
C. Constitutionally Protected Reproductive Freedom
Once the Court established that the right to privacy applied to both citi-
zens' right to be secure in themselves and privacy in the home, the Court
naturally extended its reasoning to provide protection for reproductive pri-
vacy. The eugenics movement of the 1900's died out in part because the
Supreme Court recognized a person's right to reproduce in Skinner v. State
of Oklahoma.42 In Skinner, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutional-
ity of an Oklahoma statute mandating sterilization for those convicted of
felonies involving moral turpitude.4 3 After rejecting the statute as unconsti-
tutional because it lacked a rational basis for determining who was subject to
sterilization, the Court in Skinner stated that the right to reproduce is "one
of the basic civil rights of man" since it is fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race." The Court then held that it would strictly scruti-
nize any group for which the statute made sterilization a mandatory pen-
alty.45 Part of the reason for the Court's holding in Skinner was that, in the
early 1900's, sterilization was a permanent surgical procedure for which
there was no redemption and would forever deprive the afflicted of a basic
brought by the parents and coguardians of Nancy Cruzan, a young woman in a persistent
vegetative state as a result of an automobile accident. Cruzan's parents sought judicial sanc-
tion of their desire to terminate the artificial hydration and nutrition sustaining their daugh-
ter's life after it became apparent that "she had virtually no chance to recover her cognitive
faculties." Id. at 2845. The Supreme Court confirmed that a competent person has a constitu-
tional right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Id. at 2843 (citing Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)); see also Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law").
40. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 767, the Court
endorsed the balancing test for determining whether bodily intrusions are proper and con-
firmed that freedom from such intrusions is one of the values basic to a free society.
41. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52.
42. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). A convicted man challenged the constitutionality of statutorily
mandated sterilization as a part of his sentence. Id. at 537-38. It is important to note that,
despite strong dicta regarding reproductive rights, the Court found that the statute violated
equal protection rights, since it required sterilization for some criminals but not others and
provided no rational scheme to determine who should receive the punishment. Id. at 541.
43. Id. at 536.
44. Id. at 541.
45. Id. After characterizing the right to reproduce as one of the "basic civil rights of
man," the Court observed that "the power to sterilize, if exercised ... in evil or reckless hands
... can cause races or types... inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear." Id.
The Skinner Court was motivated in part by fear of potential genocide stemming from govern-
mental control of reproduction. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 15-10 at 1339.
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liberty. 46 These concerns influenced other courts subsequent to Skinner in
their decisions to invalidate statutorily mandated permanent sterilization.
For example, in In re Truesdell,47 a case involving the involuntary steriliza-
tion of a mentally retarded woman, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
stated that recognition of procreation as a fundamental right renders inade-
quate all but the most compelling justifications for the sterilization. 48
More recently, the Supreme Court has found justification for reproductive
freedom in areas other than the Fourth Amendment. In Griswold v. Con-
necticut,49 the Supreme Court found constitutionally protected zones of pri-
vacy in various penumbras surrounding the specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights. 50 The Griswold Court then went on to hold that a state statute for-
bidding contraceptive use by married couples was unconstitutional because
the right to privacy includes marital relations." Subsequently, the Supreme
Court expanded the right to privacy to include freedom of choice in those
basic decisions respecting marriage, 52 procreation, and contraception. 53
Moreover, the Court relied on previous cases that held that the right to pri-
vacy is "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men" 54 and is a
matter in which the state should not interfere. 55
46. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
47. 304 S.E.2d 793 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). In examining a petition for an order for the
involuntary sterilization of a mentally retarded eighteen-year-old female, the court stated that
equal protection concerns dictated "strict scrutiny of both the classification of those subject to
the involuntary sterilization laws as well as the application of that classification." Id. at 799.
48. Id. at 800-01.
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. Id. at 484. The Court found the right to privacy in the penumbrae of the First
Amendment (freedom of association), Third Amendment (right not to quarter troops), Fourth
Amendment (right to be secure in the home), Fifth Amendment (right not to incriminate
oneself), and Ninth Amendment (the forfeiture clause). Id. at 484-85; see also Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969) (Court held Constitution protects right to be generally free
from governmental intrusion into a person's lifestyle); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968)
(Court held Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches protected people,
not places, and applied to citizens on the streets as well as at home); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (Court held actual entry on premises was not required for unconstitu-
tional search). But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). In
Katz, Justice Black expressed his disapproval of the Court's method of deriving a right to
privacy from the Constitution. Black stated that, by substituting the Court's language for that
of the Constitution, the Court was making the Constitution a vehicle for invalidating all laws
that offended the Court's personal concept of privacy. Id. at 373.
51. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. The Court expressed its attitude toward this kind of regu-
lation by asking, "[W]ould we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?" Id. The Court found this idea repulsive.
Id. at 485-86. Justice Goldberg, joined in a concurrence by Justice Brennan, stated that the
test for determining fundamental rights involves looking at the "traditions and collective con-
science of our people to determine whether a principle is so rooted there as to be ranked as
fundamental." Id. at 493 (quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
52. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
53. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that "marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race").
54. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
55. Id. at 400.
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In Eisenstadt v. Baird 56 the Court held that if the right of privacy was to
have real meaning, it must include the "right of any individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into" his or her
sex life, including his or her choice of whether or not to have children. 57
The Illinois District Court held in Doe v. Scott58 that the protected areas
included "women's rights to life, to control over their own bodies, and to
freedom and privacy in matters relating to sex and procreation." 59 The
Court has expanded the right to reproductive privacy to include medical
technological advancements. In Matter of Baby M,60 the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated that reproductive freedom included the right to have
children by unconventional means such as artificial insemination. 6 1
D. Roe v. Wade
In Roe v. Wade,6 2 the Supreme Court extended the right to reproductive
privacy to its most controversial extreme when it ruled that the right to
privacy was broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to have an
abortion. 63 While previous decisions focused on reproductive rights prior to
conception, Roe v. Wade was the first decision to assert that a woman's lim-
ited right to control over her body, even while pregnant, outweighed the
state's interest in the fetus, at least before viability. 64 The Court held that
the right to privacy was broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy but cautioned that such right was not absolute. 65
According to the Court, state interests in fetal life do not become compelling
enough to justify absolute prohibitions of abortions until the point of viabil-
ity, established in Roe to be the beginning of the third trimester.66
IV. CURTAILMENT OF REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM AFTER ROE V WADE
A. Modern Restrictive Theories of Women's Reproductive Freedom
Despite the expansive Supreme Court decisions regarding reproductive
rights, further expansions of a woman's right to reproductive freedom came
to a relative standstill after Roe. Responding in part to the public pressures
of the pro-life movement, several courts have gone to extreme lengths to
protect unborn fetuses by upholding increasingly restrictive abortion laws
56. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
57. Id. at 453.
58. 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).
59. Id. at 1389.
60. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
61. Id. at 1253.
62. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe involved an attack on Texas abortion laws making it a crime
to procure an abortion except by medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. Id.
at 113. Jane Roe, a single, pregnant woman, accompanied by a licensed physician, challenged
the statute as improperly invading the right of a pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy.
Id.
63. Id. at 153.
64. Id. at 152-53.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 163-64.
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and exerting physical control over pregnant women to protect the fetuses in
their wombs.67
Anti-abortion activists, dissatisfied with the Court's expansion of repro-
ductive rights, are asserting their views by focusing on the rights of the fe-
tus. 68 Proponents of fetal rights argue that Roe's recognition of compelling
state interests in fetal life gives the state authority to override a woman's
wishes and to compel the medical treatment necessary to protect the health
of a fetus. 69 Courts and legislatures wishing to curtail the abortion right
place less emphasis on women's reproductive rights and focus instead on the
state's interest in the welfare of the unborn. This approach has resulted in
startling lower court decisions. Judges are now placing pregnant women in
prison to protect unborn fetuses70 and have even gone so far as to force
pregnant women to undergo unwanted surgical procedures such as caesa-
rean sections 7' and blood transfusions to protect their unborn children.72
Viewing the mother and fetus as adversaries thus allows courts to control
women's behavior. 73
Because the existence of a fundamental privacy right does not bar all state
restrictions on the exercise of that right, 74 the Supreme Court uses strict
67. See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with
Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599
(1986) (the author analyzes the growth and development of the concept of fetal rights and its
potential impact on women's rights).
68. Andrew Patner, Handful of Prosecutors Start Treating Pregnant Drug Users as Child
Abusers, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1989, § 2 at 8. The current focus on fetal rights procured at the
expense of the mother is curious when viewed in light of the legal tradition that, absent a
special relationship, one is under no duty to come to the aid of another. According to Law-
rence Tribe, courts have long recognized the wisdom of acting as though persons can never be
used as means to benefit another. See TRIBE, supra note 38, § 15-10 at 1334-35.
69. See John A. Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J.
LEGAL MED. 333, 353-61 (1982).
70. See Ellen M. Barry, Pregnant, Addicted and Sentenced, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Winter
1991, at 23-27; Kenneth Jost, Mother versus Child, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 84-88.
71. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1240 (D.C. App. 1990). After a brief hearing at the wo-
man's hospital, the judge ordered a cesarean section to try to save the child's life despite the
mother's professed resistance to the procedure. Both mother and infant died shortly after-
wards. Id. at 1237; Jefferson v. Griffen Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459-60
(Ga. 1981) (Hill, J., concurring) (per curiam). Judge Hill acknowledged the conflict between
the fetal rights movement and our nation's historical emphasis on individual rights. He stated,
"the power of the court to order a competent adult to submit to surgery is exceedingly limited.
Indeed, until this unique case arose, I would have thought such power to be nonexistent." Id.
at 460. See generally Johnsen, supra note 67.
72. In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 1007-08, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899-900 (Sup.
Ct. 1985) (after pregnant woman refused medical treatment on religious grounds, the court
concluded that her personal interest in her religious belief was not sufficient to override the
state's interest in her unborn fetus); Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d
101, 102-03 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444-45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (court ordered that a blood trans-
fusion be given to mother for the benefit of her fetus despite religious objections of both par-
ents). For a pre-Roe example of forced medical treatment, see Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan
Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J. 1964) (ordering blood transfusions to a
Jehovah's Witness over her objection in order to save her life and that of her fetus), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
73. Johnsen, supra note 67, at 599.
74. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776-77 (199 1) (Court upheld state restric-
tions on provision of abortion information to patients of clinics receiving public funds); Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 501-11 (1989) (Court upheld Missouri
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scrutiny to determine whether statutory restrictions are necessary to further
a compelling state interest. 75 If a law is necessary to implement a permissi-
ble state policy 76 and is the least intrusive means available to achieve that
policy, it may be upheld.
77
B. Recent Court Decisions Narrowing Women's Reproductive Choices
Decisions since Roe emphasize that the right to an abortion is not absolute
but is subject to reasonable state restrictions when those restrictions are nec-
essary to achieve legitimate state ends. 78 The Supreme Court in Maher v.
Roe 79 upheld a state statute prohibiting the use of federal funds to finance
abortions for indigent women and others, holding that a woman's freedom of
choice does not carry with it constitutional entitlement to the financial re-
sources necessary for her to exercise that choice.80 The Court held that
withholding federal funding for abortions does not foreclose a woman's
choice any more than would the state's provision of no funding at all. 81 This
holding ignores the fact that for poor women who cannot afford to pay for
their own treatments, abortions are effectively withheld.
82
statute restricting use of public employees or facilities to perform or assist in performing thera-
peutic abortion); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-11, 315 (1980) (Court upheld statute
allowing state refusal to provide Medicaid funds for medically necessary abortions and held
that this refusal presented no obstacle to women's ability to get an abortion).
75. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969); Skinner, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
76. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Fischer v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 482 A.2d 1148,
1156 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984); Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866,
876, 625 P.2d 779, 789 (1981).
77. In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d. 793, 801 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Sheldon v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960); see also Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779,
789 (Cal. 1981). In Myers, The California Supreme Court articulated the barriers a statute
must overcome when it seeks to hinder exercise of fundamental rights. First, the statute "must
establish that the imposed conditions relate to the purpose of the legislation that confers the
benefit or privilege." Myers, 876 P.2d at 786. Second, the utility of imposing the conditions
attached to the benefits must outweigh the resulting impairment of constitutional rights. Id.
Finally, "[iln imposing conditions upon the enjoyment of publicly conferred benefits, ... the
state must establish the unavailability of less offensive alternatives and demonstrate that the
conditions are drawn as narrowly as possible to further state goals. Id.
78. Carey v. Population Health Servs., 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
at 153-54.
79. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
80. Id. at 469-71. Maher was brought by two indigent women wishing to obtain abortions
who were denied state funds by a statute that withheld those abortion funds that were not
necessary to protect a woman's health, despite state provision of funds for indigent women
wishing to have children. Id.; see also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445-47 (1977) (Court held
that inclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from Medicaid coverage was reasonable given the
significant state interest in protecting potential human life); Stephen L. Isaacs, The Law of
Fertility Regulation in the United States: A 1980 Review, 19 J. FAM. L. 65, 72-74 (1980) (dis-
cussing Medicaid and other restrictions on funding abortions).
81. Maher, 432 U.S. at 469-71, 480; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 509 (1989) (The Court held that the State's decision to use public resources to en-
courage childbirth only placed no governmental obstacle in the way of a woman desiring to
abort); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980) (the Court held that governmental limits on
funding for medically necessary abortions does not impinge on a woman's right to choose to
have an abortion).
82. Maher, 432 U.S. at 482-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In Carey v. Population Services International,8 3 the Court held that laws
abridging due process rights must pass a less stringent "unduly burdensome"
or "rationally related" test.84 The plurality in Carey replaced the "strict
scrutiny" test with a "rational basis" test that would allow restrictions on
reproductive rights as long as they further a permissible state interest.8 5 In
Carey, Justice Rehnquist's dissent showed his exasperation with Court-cre-
ated privacy laws by stating that he did not believe that those who "valiantly
but vainly defended the heights of Bunker Hill" ever imagined that the Con-
stitution for which they were fighting would be stretched to current limits. 86
In Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,8 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White stated that they found no mention
of a right to reproductive privacy in the Constitution and that they found it
doubtful that the framers considered the right during the drafting process.8 8
Justice O'Connor also displayed her willingness to sustain significant limits
on reproductive freedom by using the "undue burden" test on restrictive
state laws. 89 She seemed reluctant to uphold affirmative state actions com-
pletely curtailing reproductive freedom, although her "compelling state in-
terest" test could serve to uphold forced sterilizations by the state.90
Because of the importance of Roe in establishing reproductive freedom,
the Court's demotion of a woman's reproductive right to a due process right
indicates that the Court is receptive to varied legislation severely curtailing
83. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (White, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice White stated
that post-Griswold Court decisions regarding reproductive privacy put Griswold in proper per-
spective. "Griswold may no longer be read as holding only that a State may not prohibit a
married couple's use of contraceptives. Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is
that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified
intrusions by the State." Thornburg v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 775 (1986) (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 687 (1977)).
84. Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 771-
72 (1986).
85. Carey, 431 U.S. at 696; see Eric M. Haas, Webster, Privacy, & RU486, 6 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y, 277, 286 (1990); see also JOHN E. NOWAK, ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 696 (3d ed. 1986).
86. Carey, 431 U.S. at 717.
87. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
88. Id. at 789. For scholarly predictions concerning the future of Roe, see Walter Dellin-
ger & Gene B. Sperling, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Abortion and the Supreme
Court - The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83, 90 (1989); Daniel A. Farber &
John E. Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate: Judicial Experience with the 1980's "Reasonableness"
Test, 76 VA. L. REV. 519, 538 (1990); James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, What Does
Webster Mean?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 157-65 (1989).
89. Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 88. In Thornburg, Justice O'Connor stated that
states have "compelling interests in ensuring maternal health and in protecting potential
human life and these interests throughout pregnancy." 476 U.S. at 828. She then claimed that
"under this Court's fundamental-rights jurisprudence, judicial scrutiny of state regulation of
abortion should be limited to whether the state law bears a rational relationship to legitimate
purposes." Id. An undue burden, according to O'Connor, "will generally be found in situa-
tions involving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision, not wherever a
state regulation may inhibit abortions." Id. She then added that even "if a state law does
interfere with the abortion decision to an extent that is unduly burdensome so that it becomes
necessary to apply an exacting standard of review, the possibility remains that the statute
might withstand the stricter scrutiny." Id.
90. Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 88, at 98-99.
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women's reproductive choices after conception. 9 1 This receptiveness might
extend to legislation curtailing reproductive choice before conception as
well. The state has a legitimate interest in ending child abuse, drug-addicted
infants, and poverty. If forced sterilization is the least intrusive means avail-
able to reach those legitimate goals and "compelling state interest" is given
its usual interpretation, state interests may overcome a woman's liberty in-
terests enough to allow forced sterilization of this type.
92
C Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services93 the Supreme Court refused
to rule on the constitutionality of the statute's preamble, which stated that
life begins at conception and that the state has an interest in protecting that
life.94 The Court upheld the statute's prohibitions limiting any employee or
facility that received state funding from assisting in or performing abor-
tions.95 The plurality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterated the idea
that although "stare decisis is a cornerstone of our legal system," the Court
considers it less persuasive in constitutional cases in which the Supreme
Court alone may make changes. 96 This timely rejection of a long-accepted
legal principle may indicate the Court's willingness to overrule Roe.
9 7
Although the majority in Webster expressed its desire to overrule Roe qui-
etly,98 Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, explicitly stated that he wished to
91. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2980-84 (1990); Webster
v. Reproductive Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507-11 (1989).
92. Haas, supra note 85, at 286.
93. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Webster was a declaratory judgment action in which state em-
ployed health professionals and nonprofit corporations providing abortion services challenged
the constitutionality of a Missouri statute regulating performance of abortions. Id. at 500-03.
The statute in question stated, in its preamble, that human life begins at conception and that
the unborn have protectable interests in life and health. Id. at 504. The statute required doc-
tors performing abortions to first medically ascertain whether the fetus was viable, id. at 513-
21, forbade the use of public employees to perform or assist in preforming abortions unneces-
sary to protect maternal life, and forbade performance of medically unnecessary abortions in
facilities receiving public aid. Id. at 507-11. The statute made it unlawful to use public funds
to encourage or even counsel women to have unnecessary abortions. Id. at 511-13. The dis-
trict court and court of appeals both held the statute unconstitutional as violative of a woman's
right to choose abortion as stated in Roe v. Wade. Id. at 502-04.
94. Id. at 504-07.
95. Id. at 509-10.
96. Id. at 518.
97. Id. at 538 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 88, at
83-84.
98. Id. at 538 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Blackman stated,
Today ... the fundamental constitutional right of women to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy, survive[s], but [is] not secure .... The plurality opinion
is filled with winks, and nods, and knowing glances to those who would do away
with Roe explicitly, but turns a stone face to anyone in search of what the plural-
ity conceives as the scope of a woman's right under the Due Process Clause to
terminate a pregnancy free from the coercive and brooding influence of the
State .... I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the millions
of women who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since Roe was de-




overrule Roe.99 In his opinion, the Constitution contains no express right to
abortion, the abortion right cannot be found in traditions, and it cannot be
logically deduced from the text of the Constitution. '00
The dissenting trio in Webster, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, ac-
knowledged the dark future for Roe. Writing the dissenting opinion, Black-
mun stated that "the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind
blows."' 0 ' Given the appointment of Justices Souter and Thomas, conserva-
tive replacements for Brennan and Marshall, Blackmun's predictions may at
some time prove true. 102
V. FORCED TEMPORARY STERILIZATION
A. The Constitutionality of Forced Norplant Implants
Judge Broadman's decision, which started the current debate about the
constitutionality of forced temporary sterilization, would not have been pos-
sible without recent medical advancements allowing for nonpermanent ster-
ilization, as before, other methods were either permanent or unreceptive to
court regulations. In providing an alternative to permanent sterilization,
Norplant became an impetus for the sterilization controversy.
B. Norplant
The Food and Drug Administration recently approved Norplant, a con-
traceptive produced by Philadelphia's Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories. 0 3 Origi-
nally manufactured in Finland, Norplant is already available in fourteen
countries and has been studied in the United States since 1972 in a multi-
center study of 2,400 women. 1°4 The contraceptive is implanted under the
skin of the upper, inner arm, using a local anesthesia in the doctor's office. 105
Upon implantation, Norplant can prevent pregnancy for up to five years. 10 6
99. Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2984. In his concurrence Justice
Scalia stated,
I continue to believe . . . as I said in my separate concurrence last Term in
Webster... that the Constitution contains no right to abortion. It is not to be
found in the longstanding traditions of our society, nor can it be logically de-
duced from the test of the Constitution-not, that is, without volunteering ajudicial answer to the nonjusticiable question of when human life begins.
Id.
101. Webster, 492 U.S. at 560 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102. Joan Beck, Marshall Exit will Reignite the Abortion Fire, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 1,
1991, at C17. Beck points out that the opportunity is near for the Court to actually overrule
Roe. Id. The Court is scheduled to hear the appeals of three restrictive and controversial state
laws on abortion in the fall of 1992. Id. One concerns a Pennsylvania statute banning abor-
tions in public hospitals for sex selection and mandates a 24-hour waiting period and parental
notification. Id. A Utah statute forbids abortion except in cases of rape, incest, fetal abnor-
malities, or potential threat to the mother's health, and a Louisiana law is similar except that it
also imposes a ten-year prison sentence and $100,000 fine for doctors who perform unauthor-
ized abortions. Id.






Studies show it is 99% effective in women under 150 pounds. 10 7
The implant itself "consists of a fan like arrangement of six silicone rubber
rods," each 1 1/3 inches long.' 0 8 The rods contain the synthetic progestin
hormone, levonorgestrel, also used in some oral contraceptives, which, when
released continuously into the body, inhibits ovulation.' 0 9 In addition, levo-
norgestrel thickens the cervical mucus, which makes it more difficult for
sperm to reach the egg. 110 Norplant removal requires minor out-patient sur-
gery and, once the device is removed, fertility returns."'
Norplant is not for everyone. It is not recommended for women with
"acute liver disease, unexplained vaginal bleeding, breast cancer, or blood
clots in the legs, lungs, and eyes."" 2 In addition, side effects reported by
those who use oral contraceptives are also found in Norplant:"
3
1. menstrual irregularity ranging from prolonged bleeding to spotting,
missed, or nonexistent periods;
2. "headaches, mood changes, nausea, and an increase in acne;'
' 1 4
3. delayed disintegration or disappearance of follicles and ectopic
pregnancies (those that occur in places other than the uterus);
4. dizziness, enlargement of the ovaries and fallopian tubes; and
5. changes in appetite, weight gain, breast tenderness, excessive growth
of body or facial hair, hair loss, and discoloration of the skin over the im-
plantation site. 15
C. Use of Norplant as a Punishment or Preventative
Legislators and courts advocate forced Norplant implantation to help
solve the problems of child abuse, drug abuse, and poverty. 1 6 Requiring
demonstrably unfit mothers to use Norplant to prevent them from having
children, or more children, seems, at first, like a good idea. It is a relatively
quick procedure involving a minimum amount of pain and is less expensive
to the state than paying for more court proceedings, imprisonment, or wel-
fare benefits. The procedure is temporary and would thus avoid any perma-
nent infringement on the affected women's rights to have children. In
addition, by the time courts ordered Norplant implantation as a punishment,
the women so sentenced would have already forfeited their constitutional




110. Norplant System, supra note I.
11. Id.
112. Cruzan, supra note 1.
113. Id.
114. Cruzan, supra note 1; Norplant System, supra note 1.
115. Norplant System, supra note 1, at 3.
116. See State v. Johnson, No 29390, slip op. at 13-14 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 10, 1991)
(motion to modify sentence); Lewin, supra note 3, at A20.
117. For statistics regarding the tremendous problem of female drug addicts having babies,
see Christy Scattarella, Forced Birth Control?-Drug Baby Boom Sparks Call to Control Fe-
male Addicts, SEATTLE TIMES, June 24, 1991, at Al. Washington state estimates that, each
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Forced Norplant implantation would ostensibly achieve various beneficial
results. Judge Broadman, in his alternative sentence for Darlene Jones, for
instance, wished to use Norplant to "cure" her of child abuse.118 Norplant
can also be used as a punishment for mothers who have drug-addicted ba-
bies. Statistics concerning drug addicted pregnant women and child abuse
show the need for state intervention. The problem is undeniably severe.1 19
Researchers estimate that as many as 375,000 newborns may be harmed by
maternal substance abuse in the United States each year. 120 Female addicts
generally will not have just one drug baby. They are far more likely to have
several, and many of these women will abandon their children. 2 1 Treat-
ment or counseling for these women is frightfully inadequate, and the costs
of maintaining the current support systems are excessive. In Washington
alone, for example, less than one in seven pregnant addicts will receive treat-
ment. ' 22 This lack of treatment costs the state from $29 million to $46 mil-
lion a year for special education and medical care for children of addicted
mothers, and costs are expected to rise. 123
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FORCED STERILIZATION
A. Questions Concerning Forced Norplant Implantation
Before courts can grasp Norplant sterilization as a solution to the
problems of child abuse and drug abuse, however, they must demarcate
boundaries for proper Norplant use to prevent temporary sterilization from
becoming a panacea for society's ailments. Several questions must be an-
swered: What rights do women have to control their reproductive systems?
What will happen to those rights if an increasingly conservative Supreme
Court continues to modify and reduce the rights of women to be secure in
themselves? Do women faced with the decision of going to prison or under-
going sterilization have a meaningful choice? Does the state have the right
to require women to make such a choice, if in fact there is one? Is the gov-
ernment really trying to prevent crime by forced Norplant implants? Or, is
the government really advocating selective reproduction, advancing the idea
that only "good" people have the right to bear children and that others who
do so are only adding to the burden on society by producing more people
like themselves? This latter idea was the basis for the eugenics movement at
the turn of the century and has the potential to resurface as lawmakers begin
hour, a woman with serious drug problems has a baby within the state. Because drugs affect
the fetuses in the womb, sometimes altering their brain chemistry, babies exposed to drugs may
be jittery, still, or inconsolable. In some cases, drugs can cut off blood supply to a limb, result-
ing in babies with missing or shriveled appendages. Id.
118. Johnson, No. 29390, at 3, 13-14.
119. Scattarella, supra note 117, at Al.
120. Paul Marcotte, Crime and Pregnancy, A.B.A.J., Aug. 1989, at 14.
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also Wendy Chavkin, Help, Don't Jail, Addicted Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, July
18, 1989, at A21 (reporting that of 78 drug treatment programs in New York City, 54%
refused treatment to all pregnant addicts, an additional 13% refused to treat pregnant addicts
on Medicaid, and another 20% refused to treat Medicaid recipients addicted to crack cocaine).
123. Scattarella, supra note 117, at Al.
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to recognize temporary sterilization, made seductively possible by Norplant,
as a quick-fix for the problems of crime and poverty in society today. A
critical analysis of these fundamental questions leads, however, to the ines-
capable conclusion that the quick-fix is, like many easy solutions, too good
to be true. Forced Norplant implantation is simply not constitutional.
B. Forced Sterilization Violates the Right to Privacy
Undoubtedly, the framers of our Constitution, constantly guided by their
concerns that all citizens be free, surely did not anticipate a state so bold
and intrusive that it would seek to force a woman 12 4 to undergo surgery and
forego procreation. 125 Nonetheless, forced Norplant sterilization, although
temporary, violates the fundamental right to privacy that the Court infers
from the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the pe-
numbrae of the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.126 Past deci-
sions of the Supreme Court considered the Constitution's failure to mention
a right to privacy irrelevant because the Constitution is a broad outline of
governmental powers and behavior and not an all-inclusive legal code.' 27
Indeed, the right to privacy is not the only fundamental right implied by our
Constitution. 128
Griswold established the right of married people to choose whether or not
to conceive a child, and the Court to date has not overruled Griswold.12 9
Later cases explicitly stated that mentally competent women must be al-
lowed to retain their freedom to choose whether or not to reproduce, even if
that means the possibility of making decisions that many would consider
unwise.130 Just as one scholar called "mandatory childbearing a totalitarian
intervention into a woman's life,"' 13 its corollary, sterilization, is equally
offensive.
124. Cruzan, supra note 1; Norplant System, supra note 1, at 1.
125. Ironically, Norplant poses no threat to male rights to reproduce despite the contribu-
tions of males to the problems of child abuse, etc., that sterilization of women is intended to
solve.
126. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485-89.
127. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317 (1819).
128. In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court found in the Constitution an implicit fundamental
right to travel. 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). The Court invalidated the statutes of two states and
the District of Columbia denying welfare benefits to residents who had not lived in the area for
at least one year. Id. at 642. The Court held that, by establishing this waiting period, the
states were impairing citizens' fundamental right of interstate movement. Id. at 630-31.
Although this right is not expressly stated in the Constitution, the Court found that the right
existed because the nature of our federal system and our constitutional ideas of personal liberty
unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the country. Id.
129. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484-86.
130. In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 823 (Colo. 1990). This case concerned compulsory ster-
ilization of a mentally disabled woman. The court found that the woman was competent to
understand the proceedings concerning her sterilization and that, because she was able to com-
prehend her behavior and its possible consequences, freedom of choice dictated that she re-
main able to make those decisions, despite her history of poor judgment. Id. at 823-24.
131. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 791 (1989); see also




C Forced Sterilization Violates Women's Rights to Equal Protection
Forced sterilization violates the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
guarantee of the right to privacy. Because there is no male equivalent to
Norplant, temporary sterilization is only available to women. Forced Nor-
plant implantations, like restrictive abortion laws, would "require women,
and only women, to endure government-mandated physical intrusions signif-
icantly more substantial than those the Court has held to [and] which violate
the constitutional principle of bodily integrity."' 13 2 Forced sterilization
would "give the state control over a woman's basic choices about reproduc-
tion and family planning."' 133 By regulating women as if their sole societal
function is to reproduce, the state fosters and encourages sexual discrimina-
tion based on the unavoidable biological fact that women can have children
and men cannot.134 One scholar argues that, "[i]n American society today,
reproductive freedom is the key to achieving gender equality. Women must
be able to determine if, when, and how they will bear children if they are
ever to gain ground and participate as equals in social, economic, and polit-
ical life."' 135 Laws regulating reproductive freedom have a critical impact on
women's status as equal citizens; therefore courts examining forced steriliza-
tion statutes have a duty to ensure that they do not reflect explicit or implicit
sexual discrimination' 36
In addition, statutes mandating temporary sterilization violate equal pro-
tection because the poor will tend to bear most of the burden the statutes
impose. According to one attorney who represents drug-addicted women in
custody battles with the state, "[t]hese women are poor, they are black, and
they are female, and that's why we're seeing them in court ... Rarely have
we had a case of a middle class or upper class woman suspected of drug use
... [brought] into court to surrender her infant. We're making perpetrators
out of victims.' 1 37 According to the Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights, poor women are sterilized by the state 49% more often than
nonpoor women. 13 8 One study has, in fact, revealed that a disproportionate
number of court-ordered caesarean sections are directed at poor and minor-
ity women. 139 Of the 121 requests by doctors and hospitals for court-or-
dered obstetrical interventions surveyed in the study, courts granted such
132. Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 88, at 92-93; see, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,
767 (1985),in which the Court enjoined surgical removal of a bullet under the skin, a relatively
low risk procedure. The procedure for Norplant implantation is also relatively low risk; how-
ever, the effects of Norplant on individual women cannot be determined until after implanta-
tion. Uncertainty also exists as to the possibility of Norplant's detrimental long-term effects.
133. Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 88, at 93; Rubenfeld, supra note 131, at 788-92; see
also TRIBE, supra note 38, § 15-10 at 1352-55 (discussing the effect abortion laws have had on
privacy).
134. Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 88, at 105.
135. SHERRILL COHEN & NADINE TAUB, A LAWMAKER'S GUIDE TO REPRODUCTIVE
FREEDOMS - A REVIEW OF REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s 5 (1989).
136. Johnsen, supra note 67, at 599.
137. Patner, supra note 68, at 8.
138. Veronika E.B. Kolder, et al., Court-Ordered Obsterical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1192, 1193 (1987).
139. Id. at 1192-93.
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interventions 86% of the time.' 4° Of the interventions granted, 81% were
for black, Asian, or Hispanic women, 24% of whom did not speak English
as their primary language.1 41 All of the women for whom the court ordered
obstetrical intervention either received public assistance or received treat-
ment in a teaching hospital clinic.1 42 Of the fifteen court orders authorizing
nonconsensual caesarean sections, 47% of women affected were black, 33%
were African or Asian, and only 20% were white. 14 3 These statistics indi-
cate that the law's coercive power is most often used on those unable to
resist its orders. 4 4
Coercive use of medical intervention generally discriminates against the
poor and minorities.14 5 Instituting such class-directed birth control would
effectively revive a social policy akin to the eugenics movement of the early
1900's. Given the current budget crisis and the fact that poor, minority wo-
men and their children add to that crisis by sapping the welfare budget, they
are even more likely targets for measures intended to prevent reproduction.
This temptation is made especially attractive by Norplant because it is not
permanent and so appears to be a more reasonable sacrifice for a utilitarian-
minded society to force upon a woman.
Even though the eugenics movement received its death blow in the Court
decisions in Skinner and Matter of Truesdell, the permanence of sterilization
options available at the time influenced those decisions.' 46 Now that Nor-
plant has made temporary sterilization possible, it has eliminated one of the
court's major objections to compulsory sterilization and has opened the door
to a modem form of the eugenics movement.
47
D. The Likely Outcome of a Supreme Court Decision on the
Constitutionality of Forced Norplant Use
After decades of expansive Court decisions regarding reproductive free-
dom, Webster 148 signaled a return to a social framework in which a woman's





144. Margaret Diamond, Comment, Echoes from Darkness: The Case of Angela C, 51 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 1061, 1093 (1990).
145. Id.
146. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (the court stated that one of its objec-
tions to sterilization was that it was a permanent surgical procedure, a punishment for which
there was no redemption, and which would forever deprive the afflicted of their basic right to
procreate). In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793, 805 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (sterilization is a "dras-
tic and extraordinary means of contraception," which was known at the time of the decision to
be substantially irreversible); see also In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712, 716-17 (1982)
(court stated that it questioned the use of compulsory sterilization because it permanently
deprives the individual of his right to procreate); In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 307
N.W.2d 881, 894 (Wis. 1981) (court emphasized the permanence of sterilization as the reason
for the extra scrutiny given to a request for compulsory sterilization).
147. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d at 805.
148. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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state interests.149 Webster recast Roe v. Wade 150 as a narrow, fact-specific
ruling, not as a landmark decision that provides the foundation for many of
women's basic expectations about their reproductive rights.1 51 This Court's
willingness to overrule Roe signals several possibilities. The Supreme Court
could curtail women's reproductive rights to exert control over their bodies
and make forced Norplant sterilization constitutionally acceptable., 52 It is
conceivable that the Court might consider important state objectives, such as
the prevention of child abuse, either inside or outside the womb, and the
prevention of drug abuse, as sufficiently compelling reasons to uphold tem-
porary sterilization with Norplant. The Court might apply Justice
O'Connor's "rationally related" test153 to determine whether it found the
state interest in preventing child abuse or drug abuse legitimate. Under
O'Connor's suggested analysis, the Court would then analyze whether, in
their opinion, forced Norplant implantation is a reasonable means to achieve
an end to child abuse and drug abuse. 154 If the Court found a legitimate
state interest rationally related to a narrowly tailored statute, it might up-
hold that statute.155
The Court will most likely, however, maintain a distinction between wo-
men's rights before and after conception and allow curtailment of those
rights only after conception when states arguably have attained a more tan-
gible interest in the new life. The Court will continue, in the tradition of
Griswold,156 to hold that the decision whether or not to conceive is funda-
mental and is not subject to government intervention. The rights to contra-
ceptive freedom and abortion are logically and legally separate. 5 7 Planned
Parenthood explained the difference in its 1963 pamphlet, Plan Your Chil-
dren For Health and Happiness, which stated, "An abortion kills the life of a
baby after it has begun .... Birth control merely postpones the beginning of
life."' 5 8 The Supreme Court recognized contraceptive rights in Griswold
long before recognizing any right to terminate a pregnancy. I 9 The Court
decided Griswold in 1965, while Roe was not decided until 1973. Justice
Scalia, in fact, recognized the distinction between the two cases during oral
arguments for Webster and asked why the Court could not separate the
two. 160
149. See Diamond, supra note 144 at 1091-94; F. Clinton Broden, Emergency Room Sur-
gery on Abortion Rights, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 827 (1990); Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod,
The Human Preembryo, The Progenitors, and the State. Toward a Dynamic Theory of Status,
Rights, & Research Policy, 5 HIGH TECH. L. J. 257, 270-76 (1990).
150. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
151. Elizabeth Carlin Benton, Note, The Constitutionality of Pregnancy Clauses in Living
Will Statutes, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1821, 1828 (1990).
152. Haas, supra note 85, at 287.
153. Id. at 285.
154. Id. at 286.
155. Id.
156. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
157. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 88, at 167.
158. Id. (quoting PLANNED PARENTHOOD-WORLD POPULATION, PLAN YOUR CHILDREN
FOR HEALTH AND HAPPINESS (1963)).
159. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485.
160. Haas, supra note 88, at 168.
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In Webster, the Court expressly or impliedly reaffirmed Griswold's exten-
sion of the right to privacy to contraceptive use. 161 The plurality opinion
took pains to distinguish its analysis of Griswold, of which the majority ap-
proved, from that of Roe. 1 62 O'Connor, 1 63 Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, 164
and Stevens165 also distinguished between Griswold and Roe. Significantly,
Justice Scalia, who articulated his desire to overturn Roe, indicated in
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 166 that Griswold was consistent with his constitu-
tional analysis. 167 Michael H. was an action to establish paternity brought
by the natural father of a child conceived during an affair with the child's
mother. 168 Relevant California law provided that a child born to a married
woman living with her husband was a child of the marriage and that the
presumption could be rebutted only by the husband or wife and only in lim-
ited circumstances. 169 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals' judgment, rejecting the natural father's procedural
and substantive due process challenges to the statute.170 Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority, stated "that the term liberty in the Due Process Clause
extends beyond freedom from physical restraint" but is not absolute. 171 Es-
tablishing boundaries for the Due Process Clause, according to Scalia, is a
treacherous task for the Court, given the inherent subjectivity of any deter-
mination of what rights are fundamental. 172 Justice Scalia expressed his
own reluctance to further expand the substantive content of the Due Process
Clause in order to strike down state statutes designed to promote state wel-
fare. 173 Scalia asserted that Due Process Clause interests denominated as
"liberty" must be fundamental interests, interests traditionally protected by
our society. 174 Scalia quoted Griswold when he stated that past Court deci-
sions reflect "continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history
161. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
162. Id. at 520-21.
163. Id. at 522 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
164. Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 560 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
167. Id. at 122-23.
168. Id. at 110.
169. Id. at 112.
170. Id. at 131-32.
171. Id. at 121.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 122. Justice Scalia quoted from Justice White's dissenting opinion in Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977). White stated,
That the Court has ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional rights
should not lead it to repeat the process at will. The Judiciary, including this
Court, is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or even the design of the Constitution . . . . The Court should be
extremely reluctant to breathe still further substantive content into the Due Pro-
cess Clause so as to strike down legislation adopted by a State or city to promote
its welfare.
Id.
174. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 122.
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[and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society."'' 75
The justices have made clear, in their recent opinions, their unwillingness
to curtail rights to reproductive freedom before conception as those rights
relate to contraceptive use. 176 Therefore, the Supreme Court, when faced
with the constitutionality of judicially or statutorily forced Norplant im-
plants, will likely characterize such efforts to force sterilization as unconsti-
tutional invasions of women's reproductive rights, even if orders or statutes
are narrowly drawn to accomplish legitimate state goals.
VII. NON-CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO FORCED NORPLANT
IMPLANTATION
Even if the Court determines that forced Norplant sterilization is a consti-
tutional punishment, it is an inappropriate punishment. 177 There are several
objections to using Norplant in this manner.' 78
1. Medicine is imprecise. Because Norplant has not been on the market
for long, there may be significant health risks that were not discovered by
premarket testing.' 79 Forcing women to use Norplant would make them
involuntary test subjects. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) re-
cently approved Norplant for marketing and use in the United States.18 0
FDA approval is a prerequisite for national marketing and widespread use of
a drug in the United States, not a guarantee that the approved drug is 100
percent safe. '8 '
A recent example of an FDA-approved drug that was not safe in the long
term is diethylstilbesterol (DES). DES is a "synthetic compound of the fe-
male hormone estrogen" that was administered to pregnant women between
1941 and 1971 to prevent miscarriages. 182 In 1947, the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration authorized the marketing of DES as a miscarriage preventative,
but only on an experimental basis, with a requirement that the drug contain
a warning label to that effect.' 83 Later studies showed that "DES may cause
cancerous vaginal and cervical growths in the daughters exposed to it before
birth, because their mothers took the drug during pregnancy."'' 84 These
daughters suffer from a form of cancer called adenocarcinoma, which
"manifests itself after a minimum latent period of 10-12 years."' 5 Adeno-
175. Id. at 121-22 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in judgment)).
176. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. at 520-21.
177. See Colleen M. Coyle, Comment, Sterilization: A Remedy for the Malady of Child
Abuse? 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y, 245-62 (1989).
178. The structure and ideas of the following objections to coercive use of Norplant were
originally used to object to forced medical intervention during pregnancy. See Comment,
Medical Technology and the Law: State Intervention during Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1556, 1583-84 (1990) [hereinafter Medical Technology].
179. Cruzan, supra note 1.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 925.
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carcinoma is a "fast-spreading and deadly disease, and radical surgery is
required" to halt its progression to other parts of the body.186 DES is also
responsible for precancerous growths called adenosis, and treatment for ade-
nosis is cauterization, surgery, or cryosurgery. "187 Women who suffer from
adenocarcinoma must undergo biopsies or colposcopic examinations twice a
year, procedures both painful and expensive. 188 Although the FDA, in
1971, ordered manufacturers of DES to cease marketing the drug, it is signif-
icant that for thirty years, this FDA-approved drug was distributed to wo-
men who would only later discover, after the harmful exposure was
completed, that the drug had potentially fatal effects.189
2. Post-abuse use of Norplant as a punishment is merely punitive and
does little to serve state goals of ending child abuse and drug abuse.' 90
Although Norplant would prevent a mother from having more children to
abuse, this punishment fails to address the crime already committed. 191
Preventing an abusive parent from having more children will not stop her
from abusing the children she already has.' 92 Therefore, implantation will
not protect the victims of crime but will instead operate only to victimize the
perpetrators. 193 Forced sterilization would punish the affected women for
crimes they have yet to commit by preventing them from having more chil-
dren when, in fact, they might not abuse those children.'
94
In In re May, 195 the Washington Court of Appeals addressed a similar
dilemma. The state juvenile court permanently terminated a fifteen-year-old
mother's custodial and parental rights to her newborn son. 196 The young
mother had a history of avoiding responsibility by running away from home,
school, and juvenile authorities. 197 She was detained by the juvenile court
for shoplifting at the time her son was born. 19 8 The state removed her son to




189. 26 Cal. 3d at 594, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34, 607 P.2d at 925-26; see also Lawrence R.
Allen, Note, A Remedy for the DES Daughters: Products Liability without the Identification
Requirement, 42 U. Prir. L. REV. 669, 670-72 (the author analyzes the Sindell case and the
potential impact the holding in favor of liability will have on drug manufacturers) (1981). For
information concerning other diseases or injuries not apparent for years or decades that may
lead to severe complications or death, see 1 STEVEN E. PEGALIS & HARVEY F. WACHSMAN,
AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1981) § 7:29 (traumatic birth injuries); § 9:18
(effects of DES on the fetus); § 9:10 (effects of birth control pills); §§ 4:7-43 (birth injuries and
antepartum care).
190. Medical Technology, supra note 178, at 1583.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1584.
194. Rachel Pine, Don't Force Birth Control on Women, USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 1991, at 8A
(Ms. Pine is Senior staff counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union's Reproductive Free-
dom Project).
195. 545 P.2d 25 (Wash Ct. App. 1976).
196. Id. at 25-26.




spect to him. 199 In the deprivation proceeding, since the mother's history
made her an unlikely candidate to be a good mother, the juvenile court per-
manently deprived her "of all parental rights and interest in her child."'2° °
The court of appeals found that the young woman was never given an
opportunity to be a parent to her son and that the state based its decision
solely on professional opinion that, because of her "youth and conduct
before she had the child she was unlikely to become a good parent."120 ' The
court of appeals held that, while the welfare of the child should be its first
consideration, the court was unwilling to disregard the parent's rights.20 2
The court held that it was unwilling to deprive a parent of her child simply
because she did not meet society's ideas of the perfect or proper parent. 20 3
The court further ruled that, absent evidence that the mother was cruel,
abusive, or neglectful toward her son or that she had mental or drug
problems, the state had no justification to deprive her of her son.2° 4 The
court stated,
It may very well be, as the social workers and psychiatrists opined...
that the odds do not favor that a petitioner of this youth and history of
avoiding responsibility will become a good parent. Fortunately for the
preservation of the human species, however, a lot of people who would
rate poorly on any scale of parental prospects have done rather well at it
when confronted by the reality of a baby .... 205
Forced Norplant implantation is also unlikely to deter other women from
committing crimes. In the case of women who use drugs while pregnant, it
can safely be said that they are addicts who do not consider the costs of their
habit or, if they do, are unable to control their actions due to their addic-
tion.20 6 A woman who has elected not to have an abortion is likely to care
about the well-being of her child even if her actions do not show it.20 7 It is
rational to assume that women are more capable of controlling their behav-





203. Id. In full, the Court stated,
While it is true that the welfare of the child should be the first consideration
of the court, yet the right of the parent is not to be disregarded, and it is assum-
ing a grave responsibility to deprive parents of the care, control, custody, and
education of their children because they do not come up to the standard of
perfection that we have established for our action in that respect. There is, per-
haps scarcely a day but that children may be seen who... are neglected, and of
whom the popular verdict would declare, that they would be better off and stand
a better chance of becoming useful members of society if they were removed
from the pernicious influence of their parents. Yet it would not do for that
reason to interfere with the domestic relations .. .
Id.
204. Id. at 27.
205. Id.
206. See Note, Rethinking Motherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Preg-
nancy, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1325, 1341-42 (1990) [hereinafter Rethinking Motherhood].
207. Id.
208. Johnsen, supra note 67, at 613.
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they will be caught, or act when consumed by rage or passion, and are un-
likely to be stopped by remote threats of forced sterilization. 2°9
3. Using Norplant as a punishment for crime, even if the crime bears a
rational relationship to reproduction, would divert government attention
and resources from establishing effective treatment programs designed to ed-
ucate, to provide counseling, parental training, and drug rehabilitation, and
to deal with and improve existing situations. 210 The solution to child abuse
and drug abuse is not to deny women reproductive autonomy through forced
sterilization. 2 11 The answer to these problems is to create conditions in
which female abusers and addicts can learn to behave properly toward their
children and to have healthy pregnancies. 2 12 Such a program would include
not only educating affected women about birth control and providing them
with a choice in making their contraceptive decisions, but also formulating
policies designed to provide prenatal care for addicts and parenting classes
for parents with abusive tendencies. 2 13
4. Coercive state behavior concerning something as fundamental as re-
productive freedom suggests that women are no more than reproductive ma-
chines, inert incubators. 2 14 This is the theory of parens patriae, which
implies that women are unable to control themselves or their bodies and that
the state therefore is justified in treating them as less capable, less intelligent,
and less deserving of their fundamental constitutional rights than men. 215
Coerced Norplant use is the ultimate example of social engineering that
avoids enabling people to help themselves. 216
5. Forced sterilization by Norplant places all the blame for these societal
problems on women and their mistakes in controlling their own behavior.
Forced sterilization of women ignores men's roles in reproduction and chil-
drearing. 217 Forced Norplant use makes women unequal citizens because of
a biological makeup that allows them to have babies despite men's equal
importance in the reproductive process. Using Norplant as a punishment
targets only women and seems premised on the belief that women can't
make their own contraceptive decisions or control their own sexual
behavior. 2 18
Forced sterilization of women brings to mind images of women like those
in Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale,2 19 in which most women were
sterile and those who were not had the duty of reproduction as their sole
209. Id.
210. Rethinking Motherhood, supra note 206, at 1341-42.
211. Id. at 1342.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. George Annas, Pregnant Women as Fetal Containers, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT,
Dec. 1986, at 13-14.
215. Id.
216. Don Williamson, Norplant-Forced Surgery is No Answer, THE SEATTLE TIMES, June
27, 1991, at A12.
217. Drug Addicted Moms-Norplant Would Enable Us to Keep Denying the Real
Problems, SEATrLE TIMES, July 16, 1991, at A7.
218. See Blank, supra note 9 at 25-28.
219. MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE 311 (1986).
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purpose in life. 220 They were "two legged wombs . . .sacred vessels. ' 22 1
Using Norplant to prevent women from reproducing implies that reproduc-
tion and childbearing are their only purposes in life and that they are not
very good even at these things. 222, If the state really wants to do something
to protect children, in the opinion of one scholar, it should do so by improv-
ing the welfare of their mothers, not by oppressing them.
2 2 3
VIII. CONCLUSION
Temporary sterilization is not an appropriate response to the admittedly
compelling problems of child abuse, drug abuse, and poverty. Depriving
women of their fundamental right to procreate is inconsistent with our gov-
ernmental system that traditionally reveres personal autonomy. The
Supreme Court has inferred a right to privacy from the Constitution for
more than a century, and considers this right to be as fundamental as those
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 224 The Court has extended this privacy
right to include reproductive freedom, and has subjected state laws seeking
to abridge that freedom to exacting scrutiny.
Despite the likelihood that the increasingly conservative Supreme Court
will curtail abortion rights, such a decision will be based on state interests in
whatever life is deemed to exist after conception. Pre-conception reproduc-
tive rights will continue to receive the Court's protection because they are
distinct from post-conception rights. Court decisions restricting abortion
rights take pains to clarify that they do not alter contraceptive freedom.
Moreover, preventing certain individuals from procreating because society
deems it best is similar to the eugenics movement of the early 1900's. Selec-
tive sterilization is based on the idea that only desirable people should have
children and be entitled to make contraceptive choices. In addition, at-
tempts to compel Norplant implantation could be challenged on equal pro-
tection grounds, since no similar punishment for men is available. The
likelihood that the policy will affect mostly poor women also makes it
suspect.
Using Norplant to solve social problems will not work. Instead, the
problems will live on; women will continue to abuse their children or abuse
drugs. Society will attain a false sense of accomplishment at having taken
affirmative action toward solving problems that so far have proven unre-
220. Id.
221. Id. at 136.
222. See Rubenfeld, supra note 131, at 788-91.
223. Annas, supra note 214, at 13-14. For a discussion of the use of sterilization as a
punishment for child abuse, its alternatives, and drawbacks, see Coyle, supra note 177, at 245-
46. The author discusses the case of South Carolina v. Williams, Indictment No. 86-187 (July
7, 1986), in which a mother pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter after she starved her
twelve-week-old son to death. Id. The woman, a classic high-risk candidate for child abuse,
had two prior child abuse convictions, but after those convictions, the state failed to provide
any treatment or counseling even though it was recommended by a psychologist. Id. When
Ms. Williams killed her infant, she received national attention after she voluntarily accepted
sterilization as a term of her plea. Id.
224. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1962).
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sponsive to state efforts. Instead of devoting public funds to drug treatment
counseling, education and parent training in order to help prevent child
abuse and to force delinquent fathers to pay child support, funds for these
programs will go to subsidize nonconsensual birth control.

